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Volume 10 Issue 4
Apr.  2023

IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica

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K. K. Zhang, C. Keliris, T. Parisini, B. Jiang, and M. M. Polycarpou, “Passive attack detection for a class of stealthy intermittent integrity attacks,” IEEE/CAA J. Autom. Sinica, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 898–915, Apr. 2023. doi: 10.1109/JAS.2023.123177
Citation: K. K. Zhang, C. Keliris, T. Parisini, B. Jiang, and M. M. Polycarpou, “Passive attack detection for a class of stealthy intermittent integrity attacks,” IEEE/CAA J. Autom. Sinica, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 898–915, Apr. 2023. doi: 10.1109/JAS.2023.123177

Passive Attack Detection for a Class of Stealthy Intermittent Integrity Attacks

doi: 10.1109/JAS.2023.123177
Funds:  This work was supported by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under the Marie Skodowska-Curie (101027980 (CSP-CPS-A-ICA), 739551 (KIOS CoE-TEAMING)), the Italian Ministry for Research in the Framework of the 2017 Program for Research Projects of National Interest (PRIN) (2017YKXYXJ), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (61903188, 62073165, 62020106003), the Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province (BK20190403), the 111 Project (B20007), and the Priority Academic Program Development of Jiangsu Higher Education Institutions
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  • This paper proposes a passive methodology for detecting a class of stealthy intermittent integrity attacks in cyber-physical systems subject to process disturbances and measurement noise. A stealthy intermittent integrity attack strategy is first proposed by modifying a zero-dynamics attack model. The stealthiness of the generated attacks is rigorously investigated under the condition that the adversary does not know precisely the system state values. In order to help detect such attacks, a backward-in-time detection residual is proposed based on an equivalent quantity of the system state change, due to the attack, at a time prior to the attack occurrence time. A key characteristic of this residual is that its magnitude increases every time a new attack occurs. To estimate this unknown residual, an optimal fixed-point smoother is proposed by minimizing a piece-wise linear quadratic cost function with a set of specifically designed weighting matrices. The smoother design guarantees robustness with respect to process disturbances and measurement noise, and is also able to maintain sensitivity as time progresses to intermittent integrity attack by resetting the covariance matrix based on the weighting matrices. The adaptive threshold is designed based on the estimated backward-in-time residual, and the attack detectability analysis is rigorously investigated to characterize quantitatively the class of attacks that can be detected by the proposed methodology. Finally, a simulation example is used to demonstrate the effectiveness of the developed methodology.

     

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  • 1 Covariance matrix and mean value are concepts used in Kalman filtering. Since LQ optimal filters have similar form with the Kalman filter, we also use the terminologies “covariance matrix” and “mean value” for the LQ optimal filters.2 Regarding adjoint system of a linear system, the definition can be found in [44].
    2 Regarding adjoint system of a linear system, the definition can be found in [44].
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    Highlights

    • A stealthy intermittent integrity attack generation strategy is formulated, which does not require that the adversary has precise knowledge of the system states. A backward-in-time detection residual is formulated, which increases in magnitude each time a new attack occurs
    • An optimal fixed-point smoother with covariance matrix resetting is proposed to implement the aforementioned backward-in-time residual. Such a smoother guarantees robustness to both disturbances and noise, and can also reset the covariance matrix to maintain sensitivity to intermittent integrity attacks
    • The corresponding adaptive threshold is designed, and an attack detectability analysis is carried out to characterize quantitatively the class of detectable stealthy intermittent integrity attacks

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