A journal of IEEE and CAA , publishes
high-quality papers in English on original
theoretical/experimental research
and development in all areas of automation
Volume 10
Issue 1
IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica
| Citation: | Z. Y. Zhang and R. L. Deng, “Impact analysis of moving target defense the frequency stability in smart grid,” IEEE/CAA J. Autom. Sinica, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 275–277, Jan. 2023. doi: 10.1109/JAS.2023.123039
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A. S. Musleh, G. Chen, and Z.-Y. Dong, “A survey on the detection algorithms for false data injection attacks in smart grids,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 2218–2234, May 2020. doi: 10.1109/TSG.2019.2949998
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X. Liu, Z. Li, and Z. Li, “Optimal protection strategy against false data injection attacks in power systems,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 1802–1810, Jul. 2017. doi: 10.1109/TSG.2015.2508449
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B. Li, T. Ding, C. Huang, J. Zhao, Y. Yang, and Y. Chen, “Detecting false data injection attacks against power system state estimation with fast go-decomposition approach,” IEEE Trans. Industrial Informatics, vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 2892–2904, May 2019. doi: 10.1109/TII.2018.2875529
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J. Qi, K. Sun, and W. Kang, “Optimal PMU placement for power system dynamic state estimation by using empirical observability,” IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 2041–2054, Jul. 2015. doi: 10.1109/TPWRS.2014.2356797
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S. Pal, B. Sikdar, and J. H. Chow, “Classification and detection of PMU data manipulation attacks using transmission line parameters,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 9, no. 5, pp. 5057–5066, Sept. 2018. doi: 10.1109/TSG.2017.2679122
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Z. Zhang, et al., “Analysis of moving target defense against false data injection attacks on power grid,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Forens. Secur., vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 2320–2335, Feb. 2020.
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T. Liu, J. Tian, J. Wang, H. Wu, L. Sun, Y. Zhou, C. Shen, and X. Guan, “Integrated security threats and defense of cyber-physical systems,” Acta Automa. Sinica, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 5–24, Jan. 2019.
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M. A. Rahman, E. Al-Shaer, and R. B. Bobba, “Moving target defense for hardening the security of the power system state estimation,” in Proc. ACM MTD, 2014, pp. 59–68.
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M. Cui and J. Wang, “Deeply hidden moving-target-defense for cybersecure unbalanced distribution systems considering voltage stability,” IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 1961–1972, May 2021. doi: 10.1109/TPWRS.2020.3031256
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S. Lakshminaraytana and D. Yau, “Cost-benefit analysis of moving-target defense in power grids,” IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 1152–1163, July. 2020.
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C. Liu, et al., “Reactance perturbation for detecting and identifying FDI attacks in power system state estimation,” IEEE J. Selected Topics Signal Processing, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 763–776, Aug. 2018. doi: 10.1109/JSTSP.2018.2846542
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J.-H. Cho, et al., “Toward proactive, adaptive defense: A survey on moving target defense,” IEEE Commun. Surveys Tutorials, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 709–745, 2020. doi: 10.1109/COMST.2019.2963791
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Z. Zhang, et al., “Zero-parameter-information data integrity attacks and countermeasures in IoT-based smart grid,” IEEE Internet Things J., vol. 8, no. 8, pp. 6608–6623, Apr. 2021. doi: 10.1109/JIOT.2021.3049818
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S. Amini, H. Mohsenian-Rad, and F. Pasqualetti, “Dynamic load altering attacks in smart grid,” in Proc. IEEE ISGT, Feb. 2015, pp. 1–5.
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R. D. Zimmerman, C. E. Murillo-Sanchez, and R. J. Thomas, “MATPOWER: Steady-state operations, planning, and analysis tools for power systems research and education,” IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 12–19, Feb. 2011. doi: 10.1109/TPWRS.2010.2051168
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