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Volume 8 Issue 12
Dec.  2021

IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica

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Article Navigation >  IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica  > 2021  >  8(12): 1868-1876
H. M. Lu, Y. Tang, and Y. Sun, "DRRS-BC: Decentralized Routing Registration System Based on Blockchain," IEEE/CAA J. Autom. Sinica, vol. 8, no. 12, pp. 1868-1876, Dec. 2021. doi: 10.1109/JAS.2021.1004204
Citation: H. M. Lu, Y. Tang, and Y. Sun, "DRRS-BC: Decentralized Routing Registration System Based on Blockchain," IEEE/CAA J. Autom. Sinica, vol. 8, no. 12, pp. 1868-1876, Dec. 2021. doi: 10.1109/JAS.2021.1004204
shu

DRRS-BC: Decentralized Routing Registration System Based on Blockchain

doi: 10.1109/JAS.2021.1004204
  • 1.

    College of Computer Science and Technology, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China

  • 2.

    School of Engineering, Kyushu Institute of Technology, Kitakyushu 804-8550, Japan

  • 3.

    School of Computer Science (National Pilot Software Engineering School), Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China

Funds:  This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (61601041) and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (2019PTB-003)
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    Abstract
  • The border gateway protocol (BGP) has become the indispensible infrastructure of the Internet as a typical inter-domain routing protocol. However, it is vulnerable to misconfigurations and malicious attacks since BGP does not provide enough authentication mechanism to the route advertisement. As a result, it has brought about many security incidents with huge economic losses. Exiting solutions to the routing security problem such as S-BGP, So-BGP, Ps-BGP, and RPKI, are based on the Public Key Infrastructure and face a high security risk from the centralized structure. In this paper, we propose the decentralized blockchain-based route registration framework-decentralized route registration system based on blockchain (DRRS-BC). In DRRS-BC, we produce a global transaction ledge by the information of address prefixes and autonomous system numbers between multiple organizations and ASs, which is maintained by all blockchain nodes and further used for authentication. By applying blockchain, DRRS-BC perfectly solves the problems of identity authentication, behavior authentication as well as the promotion and deployment problem rather than depending on the authentication center. Moreover, it resists to prefix and subprefix hijacking attacks and meets the performance and security requirements of route registration.

     

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    Highlights

    • The decentralized blockchain-based route registration framework can protect the origin of IP address prefix and avoid centralized structural risk.
    • DRRS-BC establishes a global network resource transaction ledge by the information of address prefixes and AS numbers between multiple organizations and ASs.
    • DRRS-BC is secure to prefix and subprefix hijacking attacks and meet the performance and security requirements of route registration.

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