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Volume 12 Issue 4
Apr.  2025

IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica

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Article Navigation >  IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica  > 2025  >  12(4): 776-788
Y. Zhong, Y. Yuan, H. Yuan, M. Wang, and  H. Liu,  “Multi-spacecraft formation control under false data injection attack: A cross layer fuzzy game approach,” IEEE/CAA J. Autom. Sinica, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 776–788, Apr. 2025. doi: 10.1109/JAS.2024.124872
Citation: Y. Zhong, Y. Yuan, H. Yuan, M. Wang, and  H. Liu,  “Multi-spacecraft formation control under false data injection attack: A cross layer fuzzy game approach,” IEEE/CAA J. Autom. Sinica, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 776–788, Apr. 2025. doi: 10.1109/JAS.2024.124872
shu

Multi-Spacecraft Formation Control Under False Data Injection Attack: A Cross Layer Fuzzy Game Approach

doi: 10.1109/JAS.2024.124872
Funds:  This work was supported by the Natural Science Foundation of China (62073268, 62122063, 62203360) and the Young Star of Science and Technology in Shaanxi Province (2020KJXX-078)
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    Abstract
  • In this paper, we address a cross-layer resilient control issue for a kind of multi-spacecraft system (MSS) under attack. Attackers with bad intentions use the false data injection (FDI) attack to prevent the MSS from reaching the goal of consensus. In order to ensure the effectiveness of the control, the embedded defender in MSS preliminarily allocates the defense resources among spacecrafts. Then, the attacker selects its target spacecrafts to mount FDI attack to achieve the maximum damage. In physical layer, a Nash equilibrium (NE) control strategy is proposed for MSS to quantify system performance under the effect of attacks by solving a game problem. In cyber layer, a fuzzy Stackelberg game framework is used to examine the rivalry process between the attacker and defender. The strategies of both attacker and defender are given based on the analysis of physical layer and cyber layer. Finally, a simulation example is used to test the viability of the proposed cross layer fuzzy game algorithm.

     

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    Highlights

    • The budget and controller design problem is studied by using the cross-layer game approach, and the interdependence is described by using the so-called budget of attack
    • The upper bound is utilized to describe the outcome of the game in presence of the FDI attack and the corresponding J-NE strategy is obtained
    • The conflict between attacker and defender is described by the fuzzy Stackelberg game with uncertain cost functions and the corresponding strategies are provided

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